FEB 1952 02-4AA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	
		INFORMATION REPORT NO.	5X ⁻
		ENV AMOUR CD NO.	
	COUNTRY	Iran DATE DISTR. 8 September 1952	
	SUBJECT	Kashani's Threat to Mossadegh NO. OF PAGES 1	
25X	DATE OF [NO. OF ENCLS.	
	PLACE ACQUIRED	CIRCULATE SUPPLEMENT TO 25 REPORT NO.	5X ⁻
* 1			
()		Service to the service of the servic	
25X1	OF THE UNITED S AND 794, OF THE LATION OF ITS O	CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 E U.S., CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE— THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROMIBITED.	
	* * * *	25	5X
	1,	Immediately prior to his departure from Tehran for Mecca on 26 August 1952, Ayatollah Kashani sent a message to Prime Minister Mossadegh through Ahmad Razavi, Deputy President of the Majlis. The message stated in essence that, if the present Government would not take constructive measures to remedy the current situation by the time Kashani returned to Tehran, the Majlis, under his (Kashani's) direction would have to take matters into its own hands.	
	2.	The Kashani-Mossadegh break has reached serious proportions. Kashani is motivated by a compelling ambition to become the next Prime Minister, with the present Minister of Finance Bager Seyyed Kazemi as Deputy Prime Minister. Kashani's ultimate aim is to remove the Shah and become the President of an Iranian Republic. In his drive for power Kashani has a de facto agreement with the Tudeh in opposition to Mossadegh.	
	3.	The fall of Mossadegh, followed by the abdication of the Shah, would be accompanied by tribal uprisings and a general state of provincial anarchy.	
	4.	Mossadegh's policy to date has demoralized the Army to the extent that possibly it now is incapable of suppressing a Tudeh coup attempt.	
	*	25	5X
O .	. L	•	
		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	